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Abstract: The theoretical evolution of academic beliefs and practical policymakers’
perceptions of road pricing (from now on rp) as an instrument of efficient and equitable
allocation of resources are described and analyzed. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the
logical evolution of the theory behind rp in order to understand why there has been scarce
policy impact in spite of a long theoretical tradition. In so doing I try to bring to the fore the
fundamental issues that will have to be tackled by future research in order to generate
consensus around this policy instrument.
The paper is structured in four parts. In the first part the fundamental issues of a typical
rp model are considered. Among the most important aspects one recalls: first-best/second-best
environment, short/long term analysis, homogeneous/heterogeneous time evaluation,
perfect/imperfect information, efficiency/equity analysis, use/non-use of resources generated,
private/public transportation provision. In the second part the characterizing parameters have
been interpreted in the light of the Smeed Report of 1964 that can be considered representative
of the “old belief”. In the third part the “present awareness” is expressed by the book
Internalising the Social Costs of Transport of 1993 dealing with the problem of internalising
the external costs of road transport. In the fourth part some reflections on the most promising
research areas for rp implementation and acceptance are put forward. Specific research will
have to be conducted concerning social acceptability and feasibility, simultaneous cost
internalisation, behavioral assumptions and information and pricing interconnections.
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1. Introduction
In this paper I will try, on the one hand, to trace the theoretical evolution of conception
of rp as a single instrument or as part of a policy mix in the management of excess demand for
private transportation within a urban area and, on the other, to assess policy makers’ and
citizens’ perception of rp as a demand management instrument. The analysis concerning public
acceptability cannot be overlooked if one believes, as we do, that “The ultimate test of whether
a particular program of tax earmarking is properly viewed as an indirect form of user charging
is whether those who pay the taxes approve of the program”
1.
The analysis will proceed along a scheme that (hopefully) will stimulate the emergence
of the topical differences among the models that have until quite recently characterized the
conceptual framework and therefore the expected use of rp and those that have evolved from
them. The first-best, short-run, full information, homogeneous drivers, no alternative to private
transportation, no distributional impacts, etc. scenario has evolved into a more realistic and
complicated one: second-best, short and long-term run analysis, imperfect information,
heterogeneous commuters, different alternatives to private transportation, distributional impact
analysis etc. Two works that can be considered representative of the beliefs shared by both the
policy-makers and academics in different “eras” will be compared so to confront their final
recommendations on a well informed way. I will try not only to shed light on the more relevant
differences that have come to the fore but also to indicate some of the more interesting
research patterns for the future in order to make rp a viable and accepted instrument in the
transport policy-making process.
The article is organized as follows: in paragraph two some of the fundamental aspects
of rp modeling are highlighted, in the third paragraph most relevant characteristics of the
Smeed Report that has been assumed representative of the “old beliefs” are described and
analyzed with the aim of pointing out the necessary hypotheses on which the conclusions are
based. Mirroring the third paragraph, the fourth describes and analyzes the hypotheses and
conclusions derived in the book Internalising the Social Costs of Transport, representative of
the “present awareness”, setting the stage for the fifth paragraph where suggestions for future
research patterns are put forward. Specific attention is paid to the problem of earmarking and
of the institutional setting. Paragraph six concludes.
2. Characterizing parameters of a rp model: a preliminary description
This paragraph describes the most significant and representative characteristics of a rp
model in order to confront them in paragraph 3 and 4.
Pareto optimality
The fundamental parameters to which several others are, in some way, linked is either
Pareto optimality of rp implementation strictu sensu or the less binding potential Pareto
optimality. The potential Pareto improvement criterion, usually applied in the analysis of
economic externalities, is solely concerned with efficiency aspects, bypassing equity ones since
unresolved interpersonal utility comparisons can be avoided. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation
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criterion just asks for the potential capability of the gainers to compensate the losers without
questioning the need for its actual occurrence. The important thing to them is that society as a
whole is potentially in a better position to distribute its own resources. On the other hand,
strict Pareto optimality is the discriminating factor in practical policy-making and equity issues
which should be considered at least as important as efficiency ones. This last issue is of the
utmost importance from the policy-maker’s point of view since whereas efficiency is a
constraint equity may well be an objective.
First-best versus second-best
Although from a theoretical perspective rp has been considered for a long period a
first-best solution for tackling congestion under an efficiency point of view there has de facto
been little public and political support. The standard argument rehearsed since the 1920’s is
that congestion arises since marginal social costs of road use diverge from private costs. So if
the aim is to create the most favorable conditions to get the traffic flows at the levels most
beneficial to transport as a whole, we have to make road users to take account of the costs
imposed by them on others, in other words we have to internalize the external costs by levying
a congestion charge equal to the difference between social and private costs referred to
congestion. In a second-best scenario this is not necessarily so simple since relevant changes in
the evaluation procedures occur, the efficiency-equity dilemma can no longer be avoided. The
optimization process becomes more intricate and the value of the signals provided by the price
system outside a first-best world becomes undoubtedly ambiguous.
Short-run versus long run-analysis
Although in the seminal works of Ellet
2 and Dupuit
3 the problem of tolling transport
facilities is strictly linked to the problem of investment therefore implicitly adopting a long-run
perspective. Some of the more recent literature is not always clear about the time span taken as
a reference. More in detail, if one looks at the problem of congestion in a short-run
perspective, existing road capacity is taken as given and the issue restricts to the calculation of
the net benefit maximizing with respect to the quantity of road use; whereas, from a long run
perspective, optimal road capacity and quantity of use are determined simultaneously. As
Small
4 et al. recall: “Road user charges and optimal investment, though often treated separately
by policy analysts, are facets of the same problem: both are aimed at minimizing the total costs
of building, maintaining, and using a road system. Although investment pertains to the initial
design and construction of a road and user charges pertain to ongoing user and maintenance
activities, the two are interdependent.” This is so true that in the long run one has to consider
other elements influencing the level of congestion and the effects of congestion tolls on rates of
population growth, income growth and, of course, increases in road capacity over time in
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order to estimate, among other things, to what degree does lagged adjustment in the housing
sector- a sector complementary with transportation in producing urban output- works as an
implicit congestion toll potentially representing a second-best alternative to the toll
5.
Fixed versus variable value of time
In the early works on congestion, the internalization of the excess time spent on the
network was based on the assumption that the value of the marginal unit of time was the same
for every journey
6 whereas, in subsequent works
7, it has been progressively recognized the
inevitable variability of the value of time among travelers and there has been a critical revision
of the consequences for the analysis of dropping this assumption. Further research on this issue
has showed that the values of time vary widely between users of different transport modes and
that  the strength of income relationships is mode-dependent. While for low incomes the values
are fairly similar for all modes, at higher incomes values for rail and coach users tend to
diverge from those of other modes, with urban bus-users showing the lowest variation with
income
8. Further insights into a more accurate evaluation of time can be achieved by expanding
the neo-classical model of consumer theory to include the time dimension bridging this
theoretical basis with that of discrete choice models, and providing an interesting basis for the
empirical measurement of different values of time.
Full information versus imperfect information
Most of the works on the effects of rp do not explicitly mention the quality of
information available to the network users; however, the implicit assumption is that perfect
information is available to all, since the time/cost minimizing driver hypothesis is usually put
forward. What can plausibly be approximately true in the house-to work journeys and in any
other recurrent trips is not necessarily true for others. More in detail, one can argue that in
absence of full information event though the single traveler is trying to minimize the time
allotment dedicated to transport, due to imperfect information, he is not optimizing his
position. Some work has recently been conducted on the relative efficiency and the interaction
between different information and pricing systems for the regulation of stochastic road traffic
congestion
9. This research endeavors might have particular repercussions on the acceptability
of rp since they might contribute to avoid what can be defined “congestion overkill” when a
poorly informed user might find himself in the very frustrating situation where he, not being
aware of a certain congestion situation in a determined area of the network, involuntarily
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drives into it and not only will suffer an extra time loss due to congestion but will also have to
pay for it since he is involuntarily contributing to it.
Charge earmarking
If one can safely assume the earmarking problem, to be, if not totally included in the
potential Pareto optimality versus Pareto optimality issue, at least treated under that respect,
however it deserves specific mention since it covers a specific role under the distributional side
which reverberates on the potential acceptability of the whole maneuver. Since it is almost
universally accepted that rp systems provoke undesirable distributional effects, in absence of a
redistribution of the resources generated, it becomes of the utmost importance for equity and
acceptability purposes to describe, analyze and  optimize the resource earmarking process by
adopting a critical position in evaluating the institutional environment in which the process
takes place. In other words, conscious of the state of affairs one should wonder whether the
political process can reasonably be expected to operate not only to impose charges, where they
are appropriate, but also if the level of charges imposed will be correct. Once the assumptions
on the motivations of public workers are considered to be the same as non-government
workers, that is simply welfare maximizing, one realizes that there is a strong case for a
government pricing behavior inconsistent with the normative expectations.
Public/private transportation
Another fundamental distinction that characterizes the modeling of rp effects is the
hypothesis concerning the presence, status and influence of a public transportation sector.
When taking into consideration the public transportation sector one cannot avoid making
assumptions on aspects such as cross price elasticities between public and private
transportation, effects of induced demand deriving from abandonment of private
transportation, adoption of marginal cost pricing in the transport sector, etc.  The simultaneous
analysis of the private and public transportation sector is as interesting as complicated since it
involves various aspects that have both efficiency and equity implications. Transferring a
certain percentage of demand from a less (private) to a more (public) efficient mode of
transportation might imply net benefits for the society if the allocation of the resources
improves. One should compare the larger amount of road space dedicated to public
transportation that, in a short-run context, must be subtracted from private use, with the
greater efficiency in terms of space used per person transported. On the equity side one has to
consider the effects both on the quota of users that were already using public transportation
that might be better off if the greater demand for public transportation implies an improved
service in terms of frequency, quality of the busses, new lines opened, etc, or else be worse off
if public transportation is close to saturation and, in absence of new investments, the
newcomers provoke the deterioration of the existing service.
It is most likely that the lower congestion fostered by rp will allow substantial
reductions in operating costs for the bus companies since the service provided will be produced
at a lower cost, given that less busses and less transport workers will be needed.6
Other characterizing features of rp modeling
As pointed out from the outset, there is no aim of completeness or exhaustivity in this
listing of rp modeling characterizing features, and therefore the previous description should be
looked at as simply reflecting the Author’s beliefs concerning the most meaningful parameters
to be considered though there are at least four other aspects that deserve a brief description.
One is the fixed or stochastic characterization of demand. This aspect involves the introduction
of a probabilistic approach into the model but the essence of the results does not necessarily
change. A second aspect that is to be taken into account is the network modeling method since
it might influence the kind of trade-off between congestion creation and diffusion. In various
models congestion is conceived as taking place in a bottleneck situation whereas in others a full
network is assumed.
When assuming a long-run perspective, one has necessarily to take into consideration
the secondary effects of the toll charging, since the monies levied are either channeled back
into the transportation sector at large or, more directly, are used to determine a zero increase
in the out-of-pocket money travelers have to pay, the indirect effects are always present. In this
case the distinction between short and long-term analysis blurs and the overlapping of the
adjustment process with the indirect effects becomes inextricable and both phenomena should
be considered simultaneously.
Last but not least, one has to consider the varying effects of the tariff structure and
methods of payment. It is widely recognized that different tariff structures -- variable or fixed--
and the methods of payment –pre or post-payment—might have a strong influence both on the
perception of a rp scheme as well as on the response to equal charges.
Having chosen and described the characterizing features of a rp scheme I will try to
bring to the fore the more relevant differences about the “old beliefs” models and the ”present
awareness” ones in order to derive some suggestions for the policy-making and to suggest new
research along the “future research patterns” that look more promising in terms of better
solutions to the congestion problem in accordance both to the economic principle of efficiency
as well as to the political one of equity.
3. Old beliefs
I provide a description of how the fundamental parameters of rp modeling have been
treated in the Smeed Report that is largely considered representative of a dated way of
conceiving the role of rp. The main belief that imbues the role of rp relates to the necessity of a
pricing mechanism to achieve an efficient allocation of road space within the urban context.
The statement by William Vickerey summarizes, with words which he wrote almost forty years
ago, the mainstream economist’s view :”There can be no efficient solution to the urban traffic
problem that does not include provision for charges on automobile use that are differentiated
according to time of day.”
10
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3.1 How things were supposed to work
The statement by Vickerey represents the general belief that has guided the generation
of economists who have adopted the “fundamental diagram of road traffic”
11 which relates
volume to density showing that as the density of vehicles increases, the speed at which they
travel decreases. The subsequent logical step is the derivation of the speed-flow diagram on the
basis of the relationship flow = speed * density. From the economic point of view the most
relevant relationship is that between cost per user and flow (output) since by considering
vehicle operating costs variable with speed the most important effect of congestion is the cost
attributable to the increased trip times.
Given the value travelers place on time, by inverting the speed-flow relationship, time
per mile is obtained  and by multiplying time per mile by the value of travel and adding vehicle
operating costs we get the average variable cost curve and the short-run marginal cost as time
consumed approaches infinity as the flow approaches capacity.
Having stated the technological underpinnings of the cost curves, in the absence of any
toll the equilibrium point is determined by the intersection of the AVC and the demand curve at
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a point that implies an inefficient use of road capacity since any traveler receives a benefit
greater than what he directly pays to travel. The basic economic reasoning is that in this
situation the extra cost to society, including the costs induced in terms of time losses to the
other travelers, are greater than the benefit gained by the additional user. The amount by which
the incremental cost differ from the socially optimal one is given by the area delimited by the
short-run marginal curve above and the demand curve below. The welfare loss to society is
provoked by an excessive use of the road network due to non-optimal pricing. The solution
proposed to the problem is to impose a toll, equal to the congestion externality, in order to
have equilibrium at the optimal social quantity
12.
This represents in a nutshell the logical construction of the argument in favor of, or one
should say, explaining the necessity of a rp scheme, in order to get an efficient production
(traffic flow) out of the urban road network, by internalizing the social costs imposed by
excessive private transport.
3.2 What were the explicit and implicit assumptions
Even though the description of the various steps that guide us from pointing out the
inefficient allocation of urban road infrastructure to charging a toll is linear and, given the
assumptions, unexceptionable, one has to meditate on the fact that “The best policy to deal
with urban road congestion is likely to be some form of road pricing. However, road pricing is
the exception rather than the rule”.
13 How can this be the dim reality, “As the irresistible force
of increasing traffic demand meets the immovable object of fixed road space in urban areas, the
benefits to be gained from intervening with congestion pricing grow greater”
14?
If the reasoning is convincing and the logic adopted has no flows one has to look at the
hypotheses, implicit and explicit, chosen and verify if those are sufficiently close to reality to be
an appropriate point of departure. Armed with the previously defined model characterizing
parameters I will discuss the various assumptions made in the Smeed Report.
The Smeed Report of 1964, is the output of a working group instituted by Ministry of
Transportation of the United Kingdom, and was intended as a preliminary analysis to verify the
technical possibilities and economic implications of the adoption of a rp scheme. The general
hypothesis on which the working group based its activities was that the introduction  of prices
linked to the use of the road network were to be accompanied by a reduction of equal amount
of existing taxation so that car drivers as a group would not end up paying more that they
previously did. So even if there is a conscious expectation of some welfare distribution impact
there is not a specific mention or interest in its measurement. The fact that some individuals
and some companies will inevitably be paying more and other less simply stimulates a
recommendation concerning research on this issue to be performed at the same time when
implementing any sort of pricing mechanism. Since the problem is acknowledged but with
inadequate perception of its real influence on its final acceptance one notices that no distinction
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is made between potential and actual Pareto improvement since the distributional impact is on
average considered small and the two concepts equivalent.
Rp is examined both in a long and short run perspective, since it is expressly mentioned
that the demand management to be achieved through it should not be considered an alternative
to the construction of new roads but rather an instrument to obtain a more efficient evaluation
of the present network and of the roads that are about to be constructed. Rp is conceived to be
instrumental to the emergence of the willingness to pay for roads and the influence on the long
time changes in land use patterns are not considered even though they are relevant for
assessing the overall distributional impacts of the maneuver.
The distributional issue is mentioned but not sufficiently analyzed since it is considered
important only on a group level (drivers/non-drivers) and congestion charging effects are
assumed to be linked to the expenditure of the resources generated. It is suggested that the
resources could be allocated in the following ways: divided between the local and national
fiscal levels in order to ameliorate the road network, spent to finance public transportation or
simply stored. Even though distributional impact analysis is expected to be one of the most
important research themes for the future it is explicitly mentioned that it does not fall within
the research boundary of the Report. An explicit mention of the distributional impact is made,
at the class level, when stating that car drivers were to benefit from a rp system if the resources
obtained from road charging were used to reduce the tax burden of the transport sector.
A fortiori one can say that the earmarking aspect is not sufficiently analyzed even if it is
recognized to be important and suggestions on its role are simply defined on a hypothetical
basis.
The interaction between congestion charging and private transportation is addressed in
connection with monetary evaluation of time. The monetary value attributed by a road user to
a trip is the price he/she would be willing to pay to actually make it and the monetary value of
the costs caused by other individuals are measured by how much they would be willing to pay
to avoid these costs. The level of agreement on  this estimation method of monetary values and
the comparability of its results substantially depends on the acceptability of the present
distribution of income and wealth among the relevant parts involved in the process and of the
respect of the marginal pricing principle in the alternative methods of transportation.
No specific mention is made of cross elasticities between different modes. The issue of
public transport arises again when considering the benefits related to rp. The reduction of
congestion through rp will guarantee for the bus operating company a higher productivity of
the bus fleet  since the same number of routes will be served with less vehicles and less
workers giving rise to both an investment and operational cost saving.
No specific mention is made about assumptions on the first or second best environment.
Even though other policy instruments such as parking policies and fuel taxes are evaluated, the
full implications of the introduction of a first best instrument in a second best world are not. As
it was previously recalled concerning the treatment of public transportation, rp pricing is seen,
if not completely, predominantly in isolation and therefore all the problems caused by the
subsidization of public transportation and the departure from the application of marginal cost
pricing to both sectors are not properly considered.
Similar fate is reserved to the evaluation of time since no explicit mention is made of10
the possible problems of the estimation of its value and, more specifically, of the influence of
its variability on the outcomes of the implementation of a rp scheme. It is therefore assumed
that in absence of any specific mention of the time evaluation its value is considered constant
and independent of the context and amount of time saved.
The same can be said about full versus imperfect information context. No mention is
made of the question and is therefore assumed that full information characterizes the policy
prescriptions put forward in the Report.
Finally as it is for the complementary characteristics of a typical rp scheme one as to
evidence that a lot of emphasis is put on the tariff structure and on the methods of payment
while practically nothing is said about network modeling if one excludes the necessity
expressed for the applicability of the system to a large number of people. Secondary effects and
network modeling are not deemed noteworthy. The operational requisites for the
implementation of a rp scheme foresee a tariff, on the one hand, strictly correlated to the use
made of the road infrastructure resource, therefore variable in different periods of the day,
week, year and, in contrast with this, on the other, a tariff that should be stable, easy to be
ascertained by road users before starting a trip.
4. Present awareness
In this paragraph a description is provided of how the fundamental parameters of rp
modeling have been treated in the work Internalising the social cost of transport published in
1994 by the European Conference of Ministers of Transport which may represent, given the
Authors’ background and the context  in which the publication comes to light, the present way
of conceiving the internalising process of the social costs of transport. Among the different
instruments analysed rp plays a dominant role.
What differentiates from the outset this work from the Smeed Report is not so much
the general structure of the argumentation, that can be considered more or less similar in the
fundamental parts, but rather the emphasis put on specific issues and the realism of certain
assumptions.
One that stands out is that of the environmental costs imposed by road traffic. If there
is no doubt that the problem had already been underlined in the Smeed Report, one witnesses a
deeper and larger attention paid to the environmental problems caused by road transport such
as atmospheric, acoustic pollution, and road accidents.
On the realism of certain assumptions, one has to say that while in the Smeed Report
the distributional issue had been evidenced even though left out of the research, in this case it is
the core of the debate especially when referring to the issue of social and political acceptability.
4.1 How things are supposed to work
The general model of traffic flow which specifies the congestion problem has
substantially remained the same. What has changed is the weight given to the external costs
arising from it and to the connected internalisation policies. Quinet rightly recalls that the “..
concept of social cost involves a degree of uncertainty, related to the decision about what
constitutes the “zero level” of harmful effects in certain cases, notably for noise and air11
pollution”.
15 This specification concerning the extension of the concept of social cost
reverberates on the social cost measures expressed in absolute terms or as a percentage of
GNP. Quinet concludes that “Knowledge of transport sector social costs, .., is gradually
improving as more and better research is done. The uncertainties that remain have many
causes, most of these being related to the difficulty of calculating monetary values in the
absence of markets, and to our imperfect understanding of the harmful effects of transport in
certain fields..”
16
4.2 What are  the explicit and implicit assumptions
Rather than attempting to analyze how the various parameters I intend to give an
overall evaluation of the theses proposed and provide detailed accounting of the arguments put
forward, when appropriate, to clarify the position supported.
As it is for Pareto optimality, one can safely assert that the policy measures are
supposed to produce only potential Pareto improvements since the overall analysis is
developed in a second-best world. Glancing at the table of contents one gets an impression of a
greater attention paid to various social and political issues that were expressly ignored in the
Smeed Report. Where Button provides a wide and well articulated overview of the
internalising  process of the social costs of road transport, Banister describes the problem of
equity and acceptability, while  Rothengatter tackles that of the obstacles to the use of
economic instruments in transport policy. The economic efficiency that is sought could only
come about if property rights were allocated to the resources in question. However, since
external effects have different spatial/temporal influences, this has strong consequences on the
exercise of the property rights influencing, on the one hand, the non-linearities  expressed in
the manifestations of the polluting phenomena and, on the other, their practical applicability.
The distributional effects are expressly dealt with in the paper by Banister that opens his
reasonement by asserting that :”In all decisions relating to transport there are winners and
losers. No policy is neutral in this respect. It can also be argued that the present system is not
equitable either. The key questions to be addressed in supporting these statements are
concerned with the identification and measurement of the social costs of transport. The second
question is to establish who the winners and losers are, and to determine whether the
costs/benefits could be attributed more fairly”
17. The issue of equity is divided in three
components, interpersonal, interareal and intergenerational equity. The practical
implementation issues of a rp scheme and its acceptance induce Banister to conclude: “.. that
even though it may be desirable to have clear economic incentives concerning the
environmental costs of transport at the macro level, no major policy change is likely because of
distributional implications and public reactions which occur at the micro level.”
18
As for earmarking is concerned the positions taken by Button and Banister are
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divergent. In contrast to what has been sustained by Small about the capability of redressing
the regressive effects through the resources generated,
19, earmarking is considered, by
Banister
20, necessary but not sufficient to redress the negative distributional impacts of rp.  A
substantial asymmetry between the visible and concrete additional costs imposed (tariff) and
the eventual, not so clear, difficult to communicate and to accomplish, compensating actions
do not provide a sufficient argument for ensuring fiscal neutrality. The earmarking issue
becomes particularly relevant when, as underlined by some scholars
21, there is a substantial fear
on the policy-makers’ side about the possible adverse distributional implications since it could
be perceived as a substantial financial burden on the poorer sections of society. Button, on the
other hand, recalls that even if the fear of regressive effects is not groundless, however the
thesis put forward by Small is well founded. Button concludes that “While hypothecation of
revenues from emissions charges may, for example, not conform to all theories of public
finance, some degree of ear-marking may well be a necessary  in concomitance to the initiation
of such measures.”
22
Even though the question of time is not expressly addressed, time is assumed to have
different values for the different social groups. In fact Banister, while discussing the
distributional impact of rp schemes, assumes that the regressive impact will be strong if some
actions are not taken to strengthen public transport which, being of lower quality compared to
private transportation, is used by low income classes.
The key role of public transportation in determining the impact of rp schemes is widely
debated by Banister who, among the seven different strategies a household can adopt to meet
rp charges places, at the first place “Switch mode from private car to public transport”
23 giving
rise to a reduction in car travel. If we consider transportation a merit good, a public decision is
needed on which is the most convenient way through which the service should be made
available to those who need it. The final effect will be influenced by the presence of suitable
public transport services. The implementation of rp schemes cannot but consider the
implications an insufficient public transport network might have on its distributional effects.
The subsidisation of  public transport may then seem appropriate to take care of the problem
even if this represents a generalised strategy.
Information is not treated as a specific issue and it is implicitly assumed to be uniformly
distributed. All the drivers have a perfect information about the status of the network and if
someone ends up stuck into a traffic jam it could be assumed that he has done that on purpose.
This is very important since, as we will see, the nature of the tariff imposed has always to have
                                           
19 See K.A. Small “Using the revenues from congestion pricing” Transportation, 19, pp. 359-381, 1992 and G.
Giuliano “An assessment of the political acceptability of congestion pricing” Transportation, 19, pp. 225-358,
1992.
20 D. Banister, cit., p. 154, 1994.
21 See B.S. Frey, F. Schneider and W.W. Pommerehne “Economists’ opinions on environmental policy
instruments: analysis of a survey”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 12, pp. 62-71, 1985
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Economists’ Recommendations?” Environment and Planning, 21A, pp. 1297-1314, 1990.
22 K. Button “Overview of Internalising the Social Costs of Transport” in ECMT-OECD Internalising the
social costs of Transport, Paris, p. 28, 1994.
23 D. Banister, cit., p. 162, 1994.13
a deterring and redirecting flavour and never a punishing one. Consider what might be the
reaction of a driver that unintentionally ends up into a traffic jam and, on top of that, gets taxed
because he’s increasing congestion. The perfect, or nearly perfect, information assumption can
be reasonably made for the home-work trips that make up for the great majority of congesting
phenomena but does not hold for all the trips made.
The tariff structure and the method of payment issues are not expressly analysed,
except when Rothengatter
24 recalls that “Flexible pricing strategies according to the elasticities
of demand, for instance, help to divert traffic to less congested time periods, routes and modes,
..”. The structure of the tariff should be variable and closely related to the external cost
provoked by the action taken.
The network is modelled in a realistic way and the secondary effects are not taken into
consideration as influencing the final effects provoked by rp schemes.
5. Future research patterns
Referring to the recent literature, some suggestions are in order to indicate future
research patterns and to foster a wide acceptance of rp as an instrument of demand
management. The path to rp implementation is presumably still quite long since the cultural
revolution needed to move people from private to public transport in densely populated areas
thus transforming the more basic conception of  transport services has not materialized yet.
Under this respect the statement Button makes concerning the important roles education and
information play in changing public attitudes
25 is self-evident.
Two broad considerations, in a sense comprehending all the following ones, concern
the need for a more empirical approach to the study of rp and consequently the strengthening
of the local level approach.
Even though the debate in the literature is sill somehow heated the implementation of
rp schemes will ultimately depend on the answers to empirical questions such as: how many
people will oppose the action, what are the realistic alternatives to public transportation, is
compensation of those who lose from rp implementation feasible, etc..
Increasing economic and financial integration among different countries makes
international coordination of economic policies in general, and of environmental policies
especially, particularly acute, when an equal level of competitiveness of the firms located in the
various states is considered desirable. However, rp represents a peculiar instrument that can be
justifiable and desirable only in specific conditions (high congestion) that are not necessarily
present in all the cities in the same manner. The level of problem perception is strictly linked to
the spatial characteristics of the city involved and so is the type of solutions proposed. The
intervention approach has to consider the local context more than the national one unless all
the State is uniformly subject to the congestion problem (Singapore is an example) since the
effects which the instrument will provoke are local and so should be the policy-making level.
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Internalising the social costs of Transport, Paris, pp. 113-151, 1994.
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5.1  Feasibility and social acceptability
The actual theory about rp is accepted and the divergences in the literature concerning
the desirability of the implementation of rp schemes revolve around empirical problems such
as: distributional effects, earmarking of the resources, methods of payment, etc.  A recent
article “The Social Feasibility of Road Pricing”
26 may be a good departing point for the
analysis of the practical issues to be considered when inquiring the acceptability and feasibility
of rp. Although the optimal congestion charge, allowing all drivers have identical valuation of
all economic variables except for the marginal willingness to pay for making a trip, will ensure
a potential Pareto improvement since only the Regulator will be in a better situation and
everybody else will be worse off if there is no redistribution of the resources collected. There is
evidence in the literature that, given these assumptions, negative redistributive effects may be
greater than the efficiency gains attainable
27. However these conclusions rest heavily on the
assumptions made concerning the identical evaluation of the economic variables like, for
example, time and money. These assumptions are quite strong when considering income and
value of time that may well, or surely will, be different among drivers. If  non intervention is
taken as a benchmark two considerations are in order: intervention being regressive,
deteriorates the conditions of the poor, on the other hand, one has to wonder whether “the
progressive incidence of welfare losses from unregulated congestion provides a sound basis for
leaving this inefficiency in existence”
28. Given these premises, that lead to assume that
congestion charging can be mostly beneficial for those drivers that have a high marginal utility
of time and a low marginal utility of income, the study by Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld
investigates “the factors that determine the respondents’ opinions on road pricing”
29 The
results of the study are that there is a potential social desirability for rp based on the gains
drivers obtain in terms of reduced travel times even though they result somewhat reluctant to
pay for the morning commute to work. A recursive analysis has brought to light that the most
important elements in determining the responses are the financial transfers associated to rp and
consequently its redistributive impacts. The responses have been various and among the most
frequent one recalls: rescheduling, new job and residence search in the long run, increase use of
public transport when and where available, carpooling and trip abandonment too. Even if these
responses do not allow for quantified demand elasticities it is reasonable to assume that the
influence of rp could be substantial.
5.2  Simultaneous cost internalisation
Another important attempt that has been made in the ECMT-OECD book is that of
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considering rp effects on various external congestion costs simultaneously. This approach is
quite innovative since it introduces the issue of cost correlation induced by congestion.
Historically rp has been conceived as an instrument to tackle the problem of congestion alone.
However, excessive road use, especially in urban environments, induces several other costs
among which one can recall increased fuel consumption, greater polluting emissions,
atmospheric and acoustic, accidents and visual intrusion. The interrelations among the various
forms of external costs and their correlation with traffic congestion has not been sufficiently
analyzed probably due to the difficulty in quantifying them and in understanding their
reciprocal influences
30. One of the debated problems is, for example, that even if congestion
provokes a larger number of accidents, their relative cost can be assumed to be lower than
average due to the reduced speeds so to make controversial the final evaluation of its impact
on society. Johansson
31 makes an interesting attempt along the alley of the simultaneous
internalization considering time losses along with fuel consumption and emissions, even though
he explicitly ignores distributional and uncertainty considerations. Speed is considered the
fundamental interconnection among these three external costs and his work aims at estimating
the level of charges that should be imposed in order to achieve an optimum level of external
costs. He concludes that “.. indirect external effects of transportation may constitute important
non-negligible elements in an optimal pricing schedule”
32 and demonstrates, explicitly
underlying the highly stylized characteristics of the theoretical model used, that the optimal
road charge can be defined as a function of the current speed rather than as a function of the
traffic flow.
5.3  Behavioral assumptions
If the problem of congestion is widely viewed as one of, or even, the most important
issue in metropolitan areas, and substantial research endeavors have been conducted on how to
cope with congestion no viable solution is in sight. The large literature on the subject has
predominantly assumed a specific set of behavioral assumptions about responses to policy
measures, such as the effect of changes in the level of service or pricing on mode choice, which
do not consider the range of the possible adaptation strategies.
However, individual’s views and responses on efforts aimed at reducing congestion can
be quite different from policy-makers’ and planners’ ones so that the internalising process can
ultimately be thwarted. The policy-makers can gain a lot by comprehending how road users,
specifically,  and transport “consumers”, at large, view the situation they are confronted with.
Novaco, Stokols and Milanesi
33 state that :”Individuals pay for congestion in terms of out-of-
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pocket costs, loss of time and some additional maintenance costs resulting from slow ‘stop-
and-go’ traffic conditions. Among the non monetary costs are stress, a need to coordinate
activities and, possibly, some health effects”. It is often assumed that individuals will act
according to a superior law of social welfare whereas it should be clear that individuals will
react in a way that, given the constraints, will best suit them. Therefore only by acquiring a
deeper knowledge of the people’s travelling decision process one will be able to field policies
capable of producing the desired results. Different approaches to tackling congestion have
been adopted throughout the years and, if an increase in the infrastructure was considered
necessary in the sixties, later on the stress was on improving the management of the available
infrastructure, and subsequently in the late seventies transport systems management, aimed at
the reduction of drive-alone attitudes, were considered necessary. It is now believed that the
inevitable next step must be altering human behavior when confronted with congestion. The
relevance of the behavioral test, aimed at forecasting whether or not the measure about to be
implemented will act in the desired action, is assuming a new and more important role.
Salomon and Mokhtarian underline that “The assumptions that are (often implicitly)
incorporated into congestion-mitigating policies seem to be part of the reasons for the relative
lack of success in reducing congestion. The following assumptions seem to be particularly
incongruent with current understanding of travel behavior: 1.Assuming fixed travel demand
and ignoring the possible materialization of latent demand; 2. Assuming that the travelers are
cost minimizers rather than utility maximizers; 3. Assuming that only a limited choice set is
available to the individual, and consequently that the addition of an option is likely to have a
significant effect, and; 4.Assuming that responses to demand-management techniques are
similar to those of supply side measures.”
 34 Growing transportation costs are imposed by
rising levels of congestion therefore stimulating various forms of response. The key to effective
policy-making derives from the understanding of the response mechanism which is often
complicated and cumbersome. Future research in this direction will have to investigate with
deeper attention the implications of the dynamics of the decision process as well as the
incidence of costs and benefits of behavioral adjustments.
5.4  Information and pricing interaction
Another research vein that will presumably have great relevance in the near future is the
one investigating the possible interaction of road information systems and pricing schemes. As
it has been previously mentioned, rp schemes got to be perceived only as traffic redirecting and
reducing instruments and never as traffic “punishing”. The distinction may seem subtle but it is
extremely relevant if one considers the different reactions drivers might have. If the driver is
well informed and willingly decides to take, for example, a shorter but probably congested
route will perceive the tariff as a traffic reducing inducement to him as to everybody else,
whereas on the other hand, if he/she unexpectedly ends up into a traffic jam he/she will feel
that he/she is not only paying in terms of time lost but, on top of that, he/she is unjustly
punished by being subjected to a tariff. The reactions and the willingness to lobby against the
implementation of the pricing scheme in this second case would probably be much stronger
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than in the first one. Verhoef, Emmerink, Nijkamp and Rietveld  in a work on this issue remind
that :”As is the case for any market, efficient pricing of road usage only yields its desired
optimal effects if individual choices are based on perfect knowledge of the prevailing price and
quality of the ‘good’ to be purchased”
35.
The second best alternatives to rp, such as parking policies, fuel tax differentiation, and
so on, even though have obtained great attention, cannot achieve an appropriate tariff
discrimination, that is needed to induce an optimizing behavior, when the people it is aimed at
have different marginal utilities of time and income just to cite the two most relevant
differences that might occur. If the literature has so far addressed the issue of  information
provision and congestion charging as separate issues, it is time to consider the possible
interactions among these two forms of demand management, especially since technological
evolutions for the implementation of both actions seem to converge quite quickly. Once you
know how much congestion is located around a specific vehicle and you are able to charge a
on-board-unit a tariff in real time you would be almost simultaneously able to give the driver
detailed information concerning the general status of congestion around him. The relevance of
these interactions between information diffusion and road charging is confirmed by the
conclusions of a more recent work by Emmerink, Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld
36 where the
welfare effects of various kinds of information (perfect, imperfect an no-information)
dissemination on two groups of drivers (informed and uninformed) are examined. Given the
assumption of linear link travel cost and demand together with that of the homogeneity of
travelers except for their willingness to pay to make a trip, these scholars conclude that the
provision of either perfect or imperfect information guarantee strict Pareto improvements.
6. Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to trace the evolution of both the academic and political-
making understanding and use of rp as an instrument of congestion calming and traffic
management taking the Smeed Report as a starting point and confronting it with the ECMT-
OECD report on Internalizing the social cost of transport.
The conception of the role of rp have changed quite substantially as the paper has
shown, however, given the limited implementation of rp schemes, some specific research issues
have been suggested in order to achieve a greater social acceptability of the instrument. Among
the most promising research fields I recall: education and changing of public attitudes towards
pricing mechanisms, analysis of people’s responses to rp and of rp models behavioral
assumptions, analysis of external costs interactions and their charging, rp and road information
systems correlation, and international cooperation.
The mistrust policy-makers demonstrate in adopting potentially regressive rp schemes
is not only well founded on purely electoralistic grounds but also has a deeper economic
justification. It has for long been assumed that cost-benefit analysis should be simply dealing
with adding up the total money costs and benefits regardless of whom receives them.
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Harberger
37, with reference to this aspect, argued that it could be considered one of the “three
basic postulates” of applied welfare economics. However, even if one accepts the
compensation test as a criterion for measuring welfare change, it has been demonstrated that
not only the summation of total money gains and losses does not, in general, provide sufficient
evidence for passing these tests, since positive net money gains may be observed even when
compensation is not possible, and yet politically legitimate, but the opposite might happen too.
The question therefore inevitably becomes one of incorporating interpersonal comparisons
concerning the marginal utility of incomes of various groups into the policy decision process,
“… the justification for ignoring the distribution of gains and losses cannot be based on
hypothetical compensation as a welfare criterion”
38.  The final decision concerning the
distributional weights lies in the hand of the politician after the economist has produced the
effects of alternative sets of distributive weights proposed by the politician.
Given these considerations, the efficiency-equity trade-off becomes an even more
complicated problem. This is even more so if we analyze this issue with the tools of
microeconomics from a general equilibrium point of view and introducing a distinctive flavour
of second-best modeling. The greatest challenge  second-best modeling has brought to the
first-best conception, within the standard neoclassical tradition, concerns the essence of
welfare economics i.e. its first and second theorems. The separation between efficiency,
requiring that agents’ plans are coordinated in a market-like manner,  and equity, reached
through income transfers, allowing a separation between the final distribution of welfare from
the distribution associated to the ex-ante distribution of endowments and rights and the ex-post
price structure, is no longer possible. One can mention several reasons why this cannot be
considered acceptable and realistic, but among them the most relevant, for our purposes, are:
“limited commitment and the losses due to time inconsistencies”
39 as stressed in the
macroeconomic literature when describing the inability of Government to commit to policies,
and bureaucratic or political failures. These considerations lead us to a further one concerning
the fundamental assumptions of societal rule-making and the political structure of the
economy. The political structure of the economy in the neoclassical interpretation stems from
three basic assumptions that can be summarized as follows: neutrality of property assignments,
irrelevance of command and control, efficiency of market exchange which, taken together
imply a conceptual separation of distributional, political and allocational concerns. However it
can be demonstrated that the neoclassical model can only produce the expected results when
there is agreement between the parties concerning the relevant property rights and when this
agreement can be costlessly enforced. These assumptions hardly adapt to the congestion
problem especially if one considers the high transaction costs one would incur in organizing a
market for the exchange of rights to travel in different roads in various times of the day. Abba
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Lerner
40 has observed that, as it seems to be for neoclassical economics :”An economic
transaction is a solved political problem”.
                                           
40 A. Lerner “Th economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty” American Economic Review, vol. 62, pp.
258-262, May 1972.20
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